In Phaedrus, Plato demonstrates a surprisingly Burkean philosophy of rhetoric. Kenneth Burke believes that poetic rhetoric derives power from the identification it creates, the effects of shared experiences that come through a focus on creating a common experience rather than a polemical or persuasive artifact. Plato never mentioned the term “poetic rhetoric,” but indirectly discussed the concept in depth.
For example, one of Plato’s strongest critiques of rhetoric is aimed at rhetoricians who focus solely on onetime persuasive speechmaking. Plato claims that rhetoric is more powerful when rhetoric is viewed as part of the ongoing give-and-take of dialectic:
The reason they cannot define rhetoric is that they are ignorant of dialectic. It is their ignorance that makes them think they have discovered what rhetoric is when they have mastered only what is necessary to learn as preliminaries. So they teach these preliminaries and imagine their pupils have received a full course in rhetoric. (69-70)
These preliminaries, referred to by Plato as “methods” (65) and “techniques” (69), roughly equate to what Burke would refer to as “old rhetoric,” the bare bones of persuasive speechmaking. Burke and Plato disagree with those, like Lysias, who seem to think that these forms are enough, that speeches should be focused on figures of speech rather than context and discourse.
Plato argues that rhetoric is more powerful when the words are crafted by rhetors “standing in front of” their audience (74) able to engage in back-and-forth “in their own defense” (82). This experiential addition to rhetoric, the necessary addition to the bare bones of rhetoric, is known to Burke as identification; to Plato as dialectic. Plato’s dialectic requires a persuasive strategy which requires immediate response and discussion—a much more experiential type of persuasion than the passive one-to-many type taught by Aristotle as a way to move large audiences. For Plato, the elements of rhetoric are still important and useful, but only when used between parties who are able to examine motives and question assertions. This real-time critical analysis that sets Lysias apart from Socrates—Lysias would make strategic assertions at people, Socrates would discuss issues with people. Co-argumentation, this polishing of ideas in an informed and engaged discussion, requires that both sides allow themselves to be influenced through genuinely listening and applying opponents’ ideas to their own.
Through this opening to influence and applying opposing ideas, Plato’s dialecticians engage in an experience that requires all parties to be present and involved. If someone is passively listening—if they don’t engage in the experience—the dialectical debate loses their input and criticism. It is only as all present parties engage that the experience can meet its full dialectical potential.
Socrates grants the best rhetoricians the ability to live up to his most respected position: Nehamas suggests that “The knowledge Socrates attributes to the true rhetorician . . . is at least in part the knowledge he has earlier attributed to the dialectician or philosopher” (xli). Plato’s true rhetorician is able to combine the elements of dialectical experiences—elements that approach arguments as ongoing experiences rather than isolated statements of truth—with the polished methods and techniques of Lysias’ rhetoric.
This combination, “forever immortal” in Plato’s eyes (83), is the highest form of persuasion. This kind of rhetoric leads the speaker and the audience together toward better understanding. An understanding of this principle, Plato asserts, is how truly successful rhetoricians become successful: “Then, and only then, will you be able to use speech artfully” (83).
All quotes come from Alexander Nehamas’ translation of Phaedrus.
